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This article describes the physics and nonproliferation goals of WATCHMAN, the WAter
Cherenkov Monitor for ANtineutrinos. The baseline WATCHMAN design is a kiloton scale
gadolinium-doped (Gd) light water Cherenkov detector, placed 13 kilometers from a civil
nuclear reactor in the United States. In its first deployment phase, WATCHMAN will be
used to remotely detect a change in the operational status of the reactor, providing a first-
ever demonstration of the potential of large Gd-doped water detectors for remote reactor
monitoring for future international nuclear nonproliferation applications. A demonstration
of remote monitoring of a reactor has been called for in the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Adminstration’s (NNSA) Strategic Plan [1].
a Corresponding Author, email: bernstein3@llnl.gov
2During its first phase, the detector will also provide a critical large-scale test of the abil-
ity to tag neutrons and thus distinguish electron-flavor neutrinos and antineutrinos, using
gadolinium-doped water. This would make WATCHMAN the world’s only detector capable
of providing both direction and flavor identification of supernova neutrinos. It would also be
the world’s third largest supernova detector, and the largest in the western hemisphere.
In the first and subsequent phases, the detector will also be a flexible test-bed for a range of
large doped water Cherenkov detector technologies, including high quantum efficiency pho-
tomultipliers, Water-Based Liquid Scintillator (WbLS), picosecond light sensors, advanced
image recognition methods, and other enhancements. A separate white paper describing
Theia, a WbLS-based Advanced Scintillator Concept Detector (ASDC) has been published,
with a long-term goal of fielding a 50-100 kton WBLS detector situated at the Long Base-
line Neutrino Facility (LBNF). As described in that paper, WATCHMAN is essential to the
demonstration of the advanced technologies that will be incorporated into the ASDC [2].
The physics enabled by this technology development is described in detail in the ASDC pa-
per, including mass hierarchy measurements, measurement of CP violation in the neutrino
sector, and neutrino-less double beta decay.
Finally, if a compact accelerator is placed nearby, WATCHMAN will enable a highly sensi-
tive search for sterile neutrinos with few-meter oscillation wavelengths, and could perform a
search for Non-Standard neutrino Interactions (NSI). The sensitivity in both cases would in-
crease if a WbLS or oil-based liquid scintillator (LS) target is used. The compact accelerator
is now being developed by the ISoDAR collaboration [3].
This white paper describes the WATCHMAN conceptual design, including the results of
a detailed simulation of the signal and backgrounds, discusses our current Preferred and
Backup Alternative deployment sites, and reviews the current status of the WATCHMAN
nonproliferation and physics programs.
3I. INTRODUCTION
Gadolinium-doped water has long been proposed as a medium for large scale neutrino and
antineutrino detectors [4],[5]. Gadolinium doping is recognized as essential for detection of low
energy antineutrinos with light water Cherenkov detectors. The technique has been proposed by
the LBNE collaboration, because it would permit sensitive studies of supernovae, cosmological/relic
neutrinos and possibly proton decay [6]. Among its other attractions, WATCHMAN provides a
timely and highly subsidized opportunity to demonstrate the gadolinium option for LBNE.
The gadolinium dopant ensures efficient detection of the neutron created in charged-current
antineutrino-proton scattering, known as inverse beta decay:
ν¯ + p→ e+ + n. (1)
Here ν¯ is the incident antineutrino, p the target proton, and e+ and n the final state reaction
products, a positron and a neutron.
Compared with a pure water Cherenkov detector, gadolinium doping provides the important
advantage of an approximate six-fold increase in the efficiency for detection of the final state
neutron. This benefit derives from two useful features of the gadolinium nucleus: its high thermal
neutron capture cross-section, and the relatively high energy gamma-ray emissions arising from
the post-capture excited Gd nucleus. Even at 0.1% doping (as measured by the weight of the
Gd element), gadolinium captures about 85% of all neutrons arising from the inverse beta decay
process. The ∼8MeV gamma-cascade following capture generates a strong Cherenkov pulse that
is well above most backgrounds. This time-correlated signal associates the neutron with the energy
deposition arising from the positron which precedes it by a few tens of microseconds, with the mean
time interval determined by the thermalization and capture time of the neutron in the Gd-doped
water.
In the last ten years, significant progress has been made in demonstrating the potential of
gadolinium-doped water as an antineutrino (and neutron) detection medium. Important milestones
include the demonstration of high efficiency detection of time-correlated neutrons in a ton-scale
Gd-doped water Cherenkov detector [7], and detection of gamma-rays arising from a Gd captures
in a small enclosed cell of Gd-doped water placed near the center of the SuperKamiokande 50,000
ton pure water detector [8]. Very recently, the EGADS experiment in Japan has demonstrated
on a large scale (200 tons) the long-term compatibility of Gd-doped water with typical detector
materials such as stainless steel and Photomultiplier Tubes (PMTs), and the ability to recirculate
4and continuously purify the water via selective extraction and reintroduction of the gadolinium,
using a so-called ’molecular band-pass’ filtration system [9].
While the KamLAND liquid scintillator detector has shown sensitivity to reactor antineutrinos
at 200-400 km standoff distances [10], direct sensitivity to reactor antineutrinos has not yet
been demonstrated with a gadolinium-doped water detector. The purpose of the WATCHMAN
project is to perform such a demonstration, with important immediate and long-term benefits for
fundamental physics and for international nonproliferation.
To this end, the WATCHMAN collaboration will deploy a gadolinium-doped water detector a
few kilometers from a nuclear reactor. The current preferred deployment site is the Morton Salt
mine in Fairport Ohio, about 13 kilometers from the single core Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The
mine operators have approved use of this deployment location, the former deployment site for the
Irvine-Michigan-Brookhaven (IMB) detector [11].
The demonstration will represent a major step towards a true long range reactor monitoring ca-
pability for nonproliferation purposes. WATCHMAN will also have a strong fundamental neutrino
physics program. It will be the United States’ only supernova watch detector and will have the
unique capability of flavor identification and neutrino direction in a single detector. It would be
the third largest SN detector in the world. In addition, the same detector may be used to search
for sterile neutrino oscillations and non-standard neutrino interactions using a nearby compact
cyclotron to create an intense neutrino flux.
The WATCHMAN effort also overlaps closely with plans and technology needs in the funda-
mental science community, for very large scale detectors to study astrophysical neutrinos, neutrino
oscillations, and other physical phenomena such as proton decay and the neutrino mass hierarchy.
There is significant overlap between the membership of the WATCHMAN collaboration and that
of the Advanced Scintillator Detector Concept (ASDC) [2]. The ASDC initiative is engaged in
planning and design studies for a multi-hundred-ton WBLS detector to be built in the United
States. Because of this overlap, WATCHMAN can test technologies that are essential to the suc-
cess of ASDC and similar future detectors, in whatever country they are ultimately constructed.
Examples include the basic WATCHMAN technology of gadolinium doping and recirculation of
gadolinium-doped water, as well as testing of water-based liquid scintillator, advanced photomul-
tiplier tubes such as the Large Area Avalanche Photodetector (LAPPD) [12], wavelength-shifting
plates, wireless readout, and other innovations.
In this paper, we introduce the baseline design, site, and detector performance characteristics.
We then describe how the nonproliferation goals will be met with the baseline design. Next we
5provide analyses of sensitivity for each of the physics goals described above. We conclude with an
overview of progress to date, the likely timeline of the experiment, and its relation to other large
scale detectors being contemplated in the U.S. and worldwide.
6II. SITE SELECTION
The following detection criteria have been defined regarding the nonproliferation goal of demon-
strating remote reactor monitoring capability with Gd-H2O technology. These criteria helped
determine the depth and standoff distance for the site:
1. A signal to background ratio sufficient for 99.7% C.L. (3σ) sensitivity to the presence of a
reactor operating at full power, based on no more than roughly 30 days each of reactor-off
and reactor-on data. This implies sensitivity to a single reactor on-off transition, which we
consider most attractive from a nonproliferation standpoint.
2. A detector standoff distance no closer than 500 meters from the reactor.
3. The detector is meant to demonstrate that low event rate detection is a viable tool for the
nonproliferation community. Therefore, we imposed a requirement that the total event rate
be below a subjective threshold for rare event detection - here defined as no greater than
roughly 10 reactor antineutrino events per day. A higher event rate would mean that either
our choice of baseline was too close, or our detector mass larger than necessary to allow a
convincing demonstration of standoff detection with relatively low statistics signal.
Other design and cost criteria also influence the choice of site. These are:
1. A detector target mass of approximately one thousand tons.
2. A detector target composition of H2O + Gd-salt, with about 0.1% wt percent Gd concen-
tration.
3. An initial detector design that includes a water recirculation system capable of selective
capture and reintroduction of gadolinium (EGADS-like system).
Using these criteria, we performed an extensive survey of domestic reactor facilities and their
surroundings, considering detector deployments at both underground and underwater sites. Ex-
cavation costs are a key concern for underground sites. To keep excavation costs low, we looked
for already excavated sites near a reactor. The Morton Salt mine in Ohio was the sole site in the
US that met this criterion. It was also found to be compatible with the other detection criteria
defined above.
In addition to the Ohio site, we identified a greenfield excavation deployment at the Advanced
Test Reactor [13], near Idaho Falls in the state of Idaho. We found the geology to be compatible with
7a relatively shallow 300 mwe overburden tunnel, and a reactor standoff distance of approximately 1
kilometer. However, at this shallow depth, the higher and less well understood backgrounds would
make the measurement more challenging and riskier. The ATR site remains as a backup option in
our planning process.
A. The Morton Salt Mine and the Perry Nuclear Power Plant
The deployment site for WATCHMAN is the Morton Salt Mine in Fairport, Ohio, about 13
kilometers from the single core Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Figure 1 shows the location of the
power plant and mine along the shores of Lake Erie. Morton Salt has given our collaboration
permission to deploy the WATCHMAN detector at their facility on a cost neutral basis.
FIG. 1. The Morton Fairport Harbor Mine is 13 km from the Perry Nuclear Reactor. The site is convenient
to reach—roughly 25 miles east of Cleveland, Ohio—and has a long history of supporting DOE science
experiments.
Due to the depth and the proximity to the Perry reactor, this site is especially well suited to
a reactor monitoring experiment. In addition, the Morton company has a long history of hosting
DOE experiments. From 1980-1991, the underground laboratory site housed the IMB proton
8decay experiment. As a result, the site has an existing cavern that allows the project to avoid an
otherwise costly greenfield excavation. The layout of the cavern and laboratory are shown in Figure
2. The cavern, and the remaining IMB laboratory infrastructure permit a quick and inexpensive
refurbishment of the site with little risk of delay. Access is via a personnel lift roughly 100 meters
from the lab’s entrance; a separate, nearby ore lift serves as a secondary egress. It should be
noted that IMB was a 10,000 ton undoped water Cherenkov detector with a threshold of about
20 MeV. This high threshold and the lack of a gadolinium dopant made the detector incapable of
detecting reactor antineutrinos. However, the excavated IMB cavern is an excellent space for the
WATCHMAN deployment, significantly reducing the project cost. Further, the similarity of the
technologies gives strong confidence that it is technically possible to deploy our smaller 1000 ton
water Cherenkov detector at this site, greatly reducing risk compared to other options.
The Perry boiling water nuclear reactor is a single core commercial plant with a thermal power
rating of 3,758 MegaWatts (MWt). It is one of the most powerful of this reactor type in the
country. As one of the newest reactors built in the U.S., it is licensed to operate until March 18,
2026 and has applied for a 20 year lifetime extension. Either date is well beyond the period needed
for all phases of WATCHMAN. In addition, the Morton Salt Mine, which supplies road salt to the
Great Lakes area, has an essentially unlimited operational future since the salt deposit extends for
many miles under the lake.
The Perry option also provides a demonstration of sensitivity at greater standoff about 13 km
compared with ∼ 1−2 km for the research reactors we examined - albeit with a higher power core.
B. Reactor duty cycle
The Perry plant has a typical outage cycle of about 40-50 days. Its single core is an advantage
for our nonproliferation goal, since the contrast with background is increased compared to sites
with more than one core.
C. Site approvals for deployment
In July 2013, members of the WATCHMAN collaboration met with Morton plant personnel
at the mine. An inspection of the existing cavern showed it to be intact and suitable to accom-
modate the WATCHMAN detector. Mine management has indicated a willingness to host the
WATCHMAN detector on a cost-neutral basis.
9FIG. 2. The existing underground lab layout at the Morton salt mine in Ohio. The WATCHMAN deploy-
ment will reuse much of this space.
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III. NONPROLIFERATION DEMONSTRATION
The main purpose for the initial phase of WATCHMAN is to demonstrate high efficiency de-
tection of reactor antineutrinos in a kiloton-scale gadolinium-doped water (Gd-H2O) Cherenkov
detector. Gd-H2O is one of a few media, and possibly the only medium for which construction of
a 100-1000 kiloton scale detector is achievable on grounds of cost and environmental impact. The
WATCHMAN deployment will demonstrate many of the physics and engineering features of the
larger detectors, and will serve as a guide for their design and deployment. At the kiloton scale,
the detector would be capable of excluding the existence of an operating 10 MWt reactor with high
confidence in a ∼25 kilometer radius. This may itself have some limited utility in specific states,
in which the international community might seek to non-intrusively and cooperatively confirm
the non-operation of either known or unknown reactors within this radius. The potential utility
becomes greater if the radius can be extended to several hundred kilometers, enabling possible
cross-border detection. This requires large-scale detectors such as those now being contemplated
for deployment to pursue fundamental physics goals. The most well-developed current example is
the proposed Hyper-Kamiokande experiment [14].
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IV. BASELINE DESIGN
The baseline WATCHMAN design uses a Gd-H2O target surrounded by a connected Gd-H2O
veto region. The design is constrained by the size of the cavern space available at the preferred
location at Fairport salt mine in Ohio. The detector vessel is a large self-supporting 300 series
stainless steel tank which must fit in an area of 24.4 meters by 18.3 meters by 23.8 meters. The
diameter and height of this cylindrical tank are 15.8 meters, with a total water volume of 3540
tons, accounting for displaced water volumes. The detector is divided into two physical regions
by a PMT support structure inside the tank that separates the inner target region from the outer
veto region. The target region is filled with 1810 tons of Gd-doped water, and the outer region is
filled with 1730 tons of Gd-doped water. Inward-facing target region PMTs line the inside of the
support structure, and opposite-facing PMTs point into the veto region from the same structure.
For our baseline design, the assumed fractional PMT coverage for the surfaces of the target and
veto regions are 40% and 4% respectively. The effects of variations in the target PMT coverage
are being examined by the collaboration.
The face of the target PMTs is at a diameter of 12.8 meters. Within the region enclosed by the
target PMTs, a smaller virtual fiducial volume is defined, based on the positions of the particle
interactions as reconstructed from the variation of arrival times of Cherenkov light at the PMTs.
For a 1000 ton fiducial volume Gd-water detector, the diameter and height of this fiducial region
is 10.82 meters. The region outside of the fiducial but inside the PMTs is referred to as the buffer
region. The buffer serves to reduce the rate of gamma-rays and neutrons in the fiducial region
arising from the PMTs and external radiation.
Figure IV shows a cutaway drawing of the WATCHMAN detector. The PMTs are read out via
fast (<1 ns resolution) digitizing electronics. The arrival time and intensity of the flashes can be
reconstructed to give both the antineutrino interaction vertex and energy.
The most economical and practical method for this deployment is to have the tank fabricated
from panels that are bolted together to form the cylinder. These bolted tanks reduce the con-
tamination present in welded tanks and are faster and less labor intensive to construct. Sealing
material will used between the panels to avoid the need for internal tank liners, with the material
experimentally screened to ensure no adverse reactions with the Gd-doped water or WbLS. The
tank design is also flexible enough to allow a range of options for the location of fluid interconnects
and access ports.
Instrumenting the veto and target regions requires large numbers of submersible PMTs. Among
12
FIG. 3. A cutaway view of the WATCHMAN detector (right) showing the gadolinium-doped water target
region, the inward-facing (target) and outward facing (veto) PMTs, and cosmic ray muon veto region.
other choices, Hamamatsu 12" High Quantum Efficiency (HQE) PMTs are being considered as
the light sensor for this application. Based on preliminary simulations, 4328 such PMTs would
be required to instrument the fiducial volume and approximately 482 for the veto region. 2880
inward-facing PMTs will cover the cylinder walls and an additional 724 PMTs will line the top
and bottom surfaces of the cylinder. The remaining 482 PMTs will face the outer walls, top and
bottom of the tank forming a veto region. All the PMT assemblies will be mounted to modular
framing and/or tension cables that provide positioning and support. Based on previous large
volume detector designs, specifically the LBNE project, our PMTs will be mounted in injection
molded plastic housings that allow each PMT assembly to be secured from support structure in
precise locations.
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Table I shows the dimensions of the detector.
Region Mass (tons) Height (m) Diam./Thickness (m)
Fiducial (Gd-H2O) 1000 10.8 10.8 (diameter)
Buffer (Gd-H2O) 1049 12.8 1.0 (thickness)
Veto region (H2O) 1070 15.8 1.0 (thickness)
TABLE I. The dimensions of the WATCHMAN baseline detector.
A. WATCHMAN operational phases
The initial deployment of WATCHMAN will employ a Gd-H2O target. The WATCHMAN
program will accommodate a second phase, in which the target medium is changed to light WbLS,
with a relatively low concentration of scintillator, and possibly a third phase using pure scintillator.
The second phase in particular would allow demonstration of many of the key technologies to be
used in the ASDC/Theia detector, including LAPPDs, high quantum efficiency photomultiplier
tubes, and the light WbLS itself. The second and third phases will also accommodate a wider
range of physics goals, primarily by increasing the sensitivity to sterile neutrinos in conjunction
with the IsoDAR beam.
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V. SIMULATIONS OF REACTOR SIGNAL AND BACKGROUNDS
In this section we describe the reactor inverse beta decay signal and expected backgrounds
in the baseline WATCHMAN design, and present estimates of the signal detection efficiency and
background rejection capabilities of the detector. These estimates are based on a detailed simula-
tion of the detector using the GEANT-based Reactor Monitoring SIMulation (RMSIM) package,
maintained by UC Davis. The vertex reconstruction of events was made with the BONSAI package
maintained at UC Irvine. Using the same simulation package, we treat background and signal for
other physics processes elsewhere in the paper.
As described in the introduction, reactor antineutrinos interact with the quasi-free protons in
water to produce a positron and neutron through the Inverse Beta Decay (IBD) process. The
two final state particles generate Cherenkov light, which is detected by the PMTs surrounding the
Gd-H2O target volume. The Cherenkov flash from the positron is proportional to the energy of
the incident antineutrino. It induces single photoelectron pulses in a few dozen PMTs. Each pulse
has a width of a few tens of ns defined by the specific PMT properties and optical dispersion and
scattering in the water. This prompt signal is closely followed by a delayed Cherenkov signal with
a similar time width and a comparable number of struck PMTs. The delayed signal arises from
a cascade of multiple MeV -scale gamma-rays (summing to ∼ 8 MeV ) that are produced upon
de-excitation of the gadolinium nucleus, following its excitation by capture of the IBD-generated
neutron. The time interval between the prompt positron light and the delayed neutron light is
about 20-50 µs depending on the gadolinium loading. Compared with backgrounds, the IBD event
pairs are separated by a relatively short time interval. This temporally close event pair is often
referred to as a correlated or coincident signal. The pair of events are also relatively close spatially,
and have relatively high energies compared to most backgrounds. As our simulations show, this
combination of properties can be used to robustly suppress backgrounds and isolate a sample of
antineutrino events with good efficiency.
In Gd-H2O detectors, backgrounds for the reactor antineutrino signal fall into four main cate-
gories:
1. pairs of accidental coincidences;
2. pairs of muogenic fast neutrons;
3. beta-n decays from long-lived muogenic radionuclide on oxygen in the water; and,
15
4. Other reactors
The energies of geological beta decay antineutrinos are too low to create a significant contribu-
tion to the background in water Cherenkov detectors.
Accidental coincidence backgrounds arise when exactly two physically independent interactions
appear close in time ’accidentally’, mimicking the time-correlated antineutrino signal. These are
also referred to as uncorrelated backgrounds. The remaining backgrounds in the above list are
correlated backgrounds, meaning the same physics process produces both the prompt and delayed
events, with a time distribution similar to that of the antineutrino-induced positron-neutron signal.
The accidentals rate does not depend on depth but does depend on the composition of the detec-
tor and environs, and on factors such as the shielding distance of the inner volume from the edge of
the detector. The accidental background rate also depends on energy threshold and vertex position
in the detector, the vertex resolution and the degree of fiducialization. Fiducialization refers to
the definition of a good or ’fiducial’ central region, away from the PMTs and detector walls, based
on the reconstructed location of the event in the water volume. This location is reconstructed by
comparing the arrival times of individual Cherenkov photons at the hit PMTs. Even after fiducial-
ization, ambient radioactivity from the detector edge (PMTs and walls) may still contribute to the
accidentals rate via gamma straggling and vertex misreconstruction. The simulations described
below provide estimates of the accidentals rates before and after fiducialization.
Spallation caused by unvetoed or ’punch-through’ muogenic fast neutrons generates neutron
pairs in the target, which subsequently thermalize and capture with a time interval and energy
ranges characteristic of reactor antineutrinos. The main concern is muons interacting outside of the
detector which do not produce a veto signal. We note that neutron-induced proton recoil events
an important background in liquid scintillator detectors, are not a problem in water as nearly all
recoiling protons are below the Cherenkov threshold. This does reduce the direct contribution of
high energy neutron recoil backgrounds in the target region, but renders these fast neutron recoil
events invisible in the veto region.
Long-lived muogenic radionuclides, such as 9Li, can in the course of decaying generate paired
signals with time structures and energy depositions that are similar to the antineutrino signal.
The long lifetimes make direct vetoing of these radionuclide backgrounds difficult, though a veto
may be effected for a portion of the signal. Because this correlated background has not yet been
directly measured in water, we rely on indirect estimates from related experiments in order to set
bounds on the rates. This results in a large uncertainty in the radionuclide background estimate.
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TABLE II. Expected rate of neutrons (n) at a depth of 1400 m.w.e. emerging from the side-walls.
En above XZ Walls YZ Walls All Side Walls Flux
(Hz) (Hz) (Hz) n·day−1
>1 (MeV) 5.77e-02 4.36-02 2.03e-01 17,500
>10 (MeV) 4.02e-02 3.04e-02 1.41e-01 12,200
>100(MeV) 8.34e-03 6.30e-03 2.93e-02 2,530
Even with this uncertainty, we show here that the baseline WATCHMAN design can easily attain
the required sensitivity goals for the reactor signal.
The WATCHMAN collaboration is now in the process of making direct measurements of the
rate of correlated event production from muogenic radionuclides, using a few ton dedicated under-
ground Gd-H2O detector known as WATCHBOY. The collaboration has also fielded a high energy
neutron spectrometer, the Multiplicity and Recoil Spectrometer (MARS) at multiple depths in
an underground mine, in order to measure the fast neutron background. Upon completion of the
measurement campaigns, the WATCHBOY and MARS data will together be used to reduce the
uncertainty in the background estimates.
Absent direct measurements, we used two approaches to estimate the rate of 9Li for WATCH-
MAN. The first approach was to scale the estimated radionuclide rate from the KamLAND ex-
periment [15], a scintillator-based experiment in which the primary radionuclide production target
is carbon. The second was to scale an upper limit on radionuclide production in the Super-
Kamiokande detector [16], a water-based experiment like WATCHMAN, in which the primary
radionuclide production target is oxygen. Differences in detection efficiencies, overburden, and
fiducial mass were accounted for in the scaling process. For the KamLAND scaling, the production
rate of radionuclides on carbon was assumed to be identical to that for oxygen.
Real antineutrinos from other reactors also form a small part of the background for WATCH-
MAN. These are calculated using the IBD efficiency as derived from the simulation, based on the
locations of all known nearby reactors. This background is not significant for our measurements
at the Morton site.
We modeled the accidental coincidence rate, muogenic fast neutron and radionuclide rates in
WATCHMAN, assuming our baseline design. If no backgrounds were present, our simulations
indicate that WATCHMAN would achieve a remarkably high intrinsic signal detection efficiency
of 65%. This is indicative of the ultimate performance of the detector as it scales to larger masses,
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since the accidentals backgrounds will fall off quickly as the detector mass grows. This rapid falloff
with increasing target volume is due to the fact that the thickness of water necessary to suppress
wall and PMT backgrounds grows much more slowly than the target volume as the detector mass
is increased. However, as shown here, the efficiency of the demonstration WATCHMAN detector is
necessarily lower than 65%, since residual backgrounds must be suppressed in this relatively small
detector, at some (still relatively modest) cost in signal efficiency.
The models used for each class of background in the simulation were as follows:
1. The rate of di-neutrons from cosmogenic fast-neutrons was evaluate from Mei and Hime
predictions [17]. The neutron flux estimated for the four walls of a cavern the size of the
Davis cavern are shown in Table II. With our baseline one meter thick veto and fiducial
skin, the vast majority of the fast neutrons that reach the detector are either caught by the
detector veto or reconstruct outside of the fiducial volume. Our study shows that out of a
incident rate of 17,500 neutrons/day, only 1.3 ± 0.3 neutron/day will create a prompt and
delayed pair within the fiducial volume.
2. the U/Th/K activity from the PMT glass (341 ppb/1.33 ppm/260 ppm); gammas from the
U/Th chains were isotropically generated at the PMT were found to reconstruct within the
Fiducial volume less than 4% of the time.
3. the background arising from PMT dark noise was taken into account in two steps. First,
PMT dark noise was added in the time window of the event to properly reproduce the
triggering conditions. Second, independent toy Monte Carlo studies were made of triggers
arising from statistical fluctuation as a function of the trigger time window. The rate of
PMT dark noise induced backgrounds was found to be negligible.
4. the detector response to 9Li was evaluated by generating a positron from a beta-decay
spectrum and an associated decay neutron at a vertex distributed throughout the detector
volume and with the correct decay lifetime. The detector is more sensitive to 9Li than IBD
in part due to the higher prompt energy of the positron. The detection efficiency could be
as high as 85% depending on the triggering conditions. However, two methods are available
to reduce the rate of this background. FIrst the time veto after a high-energy muons may
be increased (particularly for showering muons, which are more likely to produce radio-
nuclides). Second, events can be removed that are near a reconstructed muon track, while
18
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FIG. 4. Detector response to reactor anti-neutrino inverse beta decay on the left. On the right is detector
response to mono energetic positrons (in kinetic energy).
allowing valid events elsewhere in the fiducial region. The results shown in this section do
not have these rejection techniques applied and are therefore conservative.
The estimates for these backgrounds as a function of detector threshold are shown in Figure 5.
TABLE III. Signal and background estimates for the Standard glass PMT option and the PMT installed 1
meter away from the fiducial volume. The best and worst case scenario are evaluated where the signal to
background ratio is maximized as is shown in Figure 5, right.
Best Case (low 9Li expectation) Worst Case (high 9Li expectation)
IBD Rate (day−1) 4.3 4.6
IBD Efficiency (%) 22 24
Background Rate (day−1) 1.8 6.5
Dark noise (≤ 4.5 kHz) (day−1) ≪ 0.1 ≪ 0.1
Accidentals coincidence (day−1) 0.2 0.3
Fast-neutron (day−1) 1.3 1.3
Radio-nuclide (9Li) (day−1) 0.3 4.9
The analysis criteria were that the events reconstruct within the 1-kton fiducial volume and
that the time difference between the prompt-positron and delayed-neutron be less than 100 µs.
This short capture time between prompt and delayed events allows both a lowering of the energy
threshold and a significant reduction in backgrounds. The accidentals coincidence rate (C) per
day can be estimated from the singles rate (S) per second with the power law C = 8.6 · S2. The
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FIG. 5. Signal and background as a function of the detector threshold and the detection sensitivity (S/
√
B)
for both the low and high estimates of radio-nuclide production. No muon tagging was assumed to reduce
this radio-nuclide rate, however the low-9Li represent a scenario where the radio-nuclide background rates
are small compared to the di-neutron rates from fast-neutron and therefore reflect the optimal improvements
that could be achieved from muon-tagging of radio-nuclide.
probability, evaluated by simulation, that two events are at most two meters from each other in the
fiducial volume is (2.3±0.5)%. This reduction results in a coincidence rate in the fiducial volume
of C = (0.20 ± 0.05) · S2.
In summary, we have shown that even with conservative assumptions about backgrounds,
the baseline WATCHMAN design can easily accomplish its main nonproliferation goal of high-
confidence detection of the reactor IBD signal using two 30 day periods of reactor on ( 100%
power) and reactor off data.The simulation package developed for the reactor analysis has been
extended in a consistent way to permit analyses of other physics interactions, which are described
in later sections of this white paper.
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VI. PHYSICS AND DETECTOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS
The WATCHMAN physics program begins with goals that are achievable with the baseline
Gd-H2O Water Cherenkov detector. The main physics goals in the first phase of the program are:
1. world-class supernova sensitivity, he first such capability in the U.S. in two decades, includ-
ing the ability to separately identify electron neutrino and antineutrino signals, to recover
directional information, and to potentially provide an early warning to experiments such as
LBNE and LIGO that seek to use a neutrino pre-trigger to arm their detectors for supernova
physics;
2. competitive sensitivity to sterile neutrinos, using a compact low energy neutrino beam pro-
vided by the ISODAR program
3. unique sensitivity to non-standard neutrino interactions, using the ISODAR neutrino beam.
In a second phase, using water-based scintillator or oil-based scintillator, the main goals are:
1. Enchanced sensitivity to sterile neutrinos and non-standard neutrino interactions, using the
ISODAR beam; and
2. increased efficiency and spectral resolution for supernova antineutrinos.
WATCHMAN’s sensitivity to the neutrino mass hierarchy was examined and found to be limited
at this standoff, regardless of the target fill.
In addition to the physics goals, WATCHMAN is an excellent U.S.-based test-bed for techno-
logical advances that are relevant for future large scale water detectors. The main technological
advance, demonstration of low energy antineutrino sensitivity using Gd-doped water, is already
the main goal of the WATCHMAN nonproliferation program. In addition, new technologies that
can be fielded in WATCHMAN include, Large Area Picosecond Photodetectors, high quantum
efficiency PMTs, U.S.-manufactured PMTs, water-based liquid scintillator, Winston cones and
wavelength shifting plates can all be tested in WATCHMAN. This will help ensure U.S. involve-
ment and competitiveness as large-scale water-based antineutrino detectors are planned and built
worldwide.
In the following sections we discuss each of the physics goals for the water detector and the
follow-on detectors.
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A. Supernova
Supernova neutrinos carry unique information about one of the most dramatic processes in the
stellar life-cycle, a process responsible for the production and dispersal of all the heavy elements
(i.e., just about everything above helium) in the universe, and therefore a process absolutely
essential not only to the look and feel of the universe as we know it, but also to life itself. As
a gauge of the community’s level of interest in these particular particles, it is worth noting that,
based upon the world sample of twenty or so neutrinos detected from SN1987A, there has on
average been a theoretical paper published once every ten days – for the last three decades! This
makes it all the more surprising that the US has not had a supernova neutrino detector of its own
in operation since the end of the IMB experiment (which recorded eight neutrinos from SN1987A)
in 1991. WATCHMAN will be the first US detector since IMB to have world-class sensitivity to
supernova neutrino and antineutrinos.
The next time a Milky Way core collapse supernova goes off, an event expected to occur every
30 years or so [18], it would be extremely desirable to have a sizable gadolinium-doped water
Cherenkov detector like WATCHMAN in operation when the resulting neutrino wave sweeps across
the planet. This is primarily because the most copious supernova neutrino signal by far (∼88%)
comes from inverse beta events. They are only produced by one of the six species of neutrinos and
antineutrinos which are generated by a stellar collapse, and so if we could tag them individually by
their follow-on neutron captures then we could extract the ν¯e time structure of the burst precisely,
gaining valuable insight into the inner dynamics of the explosion. What’s more, we could then
subtract them away from the more subtle non-ν¯e signals, uncovering additional information that
would otherwise be lost during this once-in-a-lifetime happening.
Due to its unique capability to immediately identify a galactic supernova as genuine while
the neutrino wave is still passing through the Earth, WATCHMAN will be able to instantly alert
both the astronomical community and other projects that a core collapse is currently underway.
Major physics experiments such as LBNE, LIGO, and IceCube – whose challenging SN analyses
will likely require matching extremely complex, exceedingly noise-like, and/or exceptionally sub-
threshold signals to a precise external start time – would benefit greatly from a realtime alert
from WATCHMAN. The knowledge gained in the precious few hours between the arrival of the
neutrinos (which are generated first) and the arrival of the supernova’s first light (the so-called
shock breakout) will serve to guide and optimize the subsequent multi-wavelength observations of
the dying star. In particular, the physical proximity of WATCHMAN to LBNE means that rapid
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Neutrino Percentage of Type of
Reaction Total Events Interaction
νe + p→ n+ e+ 88 Inverse Beta
νe + e
− → νe + e− 1.5 Elastic Scattering
νe + e
− → νe + e− <1 Elastic Scattering
νx + e
− → νx + e− 1 Elastic Scattering
νe +
16 O → e− +16 F 2.5 Charged Current
νe +
16 O→ e+ +16 N 1.5 Charged Current
νx +
16 O→ νx +O∗/N∗ + γ 5 Neutral Current
TABLE IV. Breakdown of supernova neutrino events expected in WATCHMAN from a galactic supernova.
Oscillations are taken into account. νx indicates the total interactions of νµ, ντ , and their antineutrinos.
(few ms) signaling of a supernova to the Long Baseline Neutrino Experiment’s [19] trigger system
is possible. This may prove to be useful in simplifying or strengthening LBNE’s supernova watch
capability, with potential attendant cost savings and improved physics reach. Additional work
with the LBNE collaboration - of which several of the present authors are members - will seek to
quantify these improvements or savings.
Table IV shows the expected signals in WATCHMAN for a galactic type II supernova. For a
stellar collapse 10,000 light years distant from earth (somewhat less than halfway to the galactic
center) there will be a total of about 4,000 events seen in WATCHMAN. As one can see, the inverse
beta events dominate the expected signals. However, there is valuable information to be gained
from the other signals, information which would be largely inaccessible without neutron tagging
from dissolved Gd2(SO4)3 .
For example, being able to tag the ν¯e events would immediately double WATCHMAN’s pointing
accuracy back to the progenitor star. This is merely the result of statistics, since our elastic scatter
events (about 3% of the total) would no longer be sitting on a large background in angular phase
space [20]. WATCHMAN would be the only detector in the world other than Super-Kamiokande
– and the only detector in the Western Hemisphere – with neutrino pointing capability. Reducing
the error on this quantity by a factor of two, roughly from 10 degrees to 5 degrees, via neutron
tagging would reduce the amount of sky to be searched by a factor of four. This could prove quite
important for the wide-field astronomical instruments which would be frantically attempting to see
the first light from the supernova.
At the same time, this event-by-event subtraction could allow identification of the initial electron
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neutrino pulse from the neutronization of the infalling stellar matter, a key and as yet unobserved
input in understanding supernova dynamics.
What’s more, the neutral current events, which may be easily identified by their mono-energetic
gammas between 5 and 10 MeV once the ν¯e events are subtracted, are very sensitive to the tem-
perature of the burst and the subsequent neutrino mixing [21].
With a neutrino energy production threshold of 15.4 MeV, the weakly backward-peaked charged
current events are even more sensitive to the burst temperature and the subsequent mixing [22]
than the NC events. As there are no other good νe detectors currently in operation, WATCHMAN’s
charged current events, if distinguishable from the ν¯e background, would provide one of the only
sources of data on supernova νe’s.
If the exploding star was big and rather close (say, like Betelgeuse at 600 light years) we would
get an early warning of its impending collapse [23]. Approximately a week before exploding,
the turn-on of silicon fusion in the core would raise the temperature of the star sufficiently that
electron-positron annihilations within its volume would begin to produce ν¯e just above inverse beta
threshold. The sub-Cherenkov positrons would be invisible, but in WATCHMAN the captures of
the resulting neutrons on Gd2(SO4)3 would result in a sudden and continuing increase of our usual
low energy singles rate.
As early as one day before collapse we would see a several sigma excursion in our low energy
singles rate. The continuing increase in singles rate would clearly indicate a coming explosion,
ensuring that we did not intentionally turn off WATCHMAN for calibration or maintenance and
thereby miss the coming explosion.
In addition, a gadolinium-enriched WATCHMAN would be sensitive to quite late black hole
formation following a supernova explosion within our galaxy, since the distinctive coincident inverse
beta signals from the cooling phase could be distinguished from the usual singles backgrounds. An
abrupt cutoff of these coincident signals occurring even several minutes after the main burst would
be the conclusive signature of a singularity being born. Direct observation of such an event would
clearly be of great value, especially when correlated with electromagnetic signals from X-ray or
gamma-ray observatories as well as gravitational wave observations.
Finally, WATCHMAN would allow us to be absolutely certain that a supernova was occurring
the moment the data started to arrive. This is because the distinctive correlated ν¯e event pairs,
with the positron and the neutron capture separated in time by only tens of microseconds, would
in general be well separated from other supernova events, which at for an explosion at 10,000
light years would come in every millisecond or so at the height of the burst. This would yield
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a clear “heartbeat”-like time structure in the time plot of the events – something that could be
easily spotted online. Of course, if the supernova was close enough that these event pairs were
overlapped by subsequent SN signals then we would also know for sure that something exciting was
happening, and in such a near-field case we may very well have been waiting for the burst anyway,
due to the early warning from silicon burning. Either way, the surer we are that a supernova has
just occurred, the faster we should be able to get word out to the community.
So, from extracting the neutronization signal, to deconvolving the main burst, to pointing back
at the progenitor star, to observing late black hole formation, to eventually announcing the event
to the world, having Gd2(SO4)3 in WATCHMAN would positively impact just about every physics
topic connected to the detection of a galactic supernova. Much of this physics would be buried in
background, degraded in precision, or wholly inaccessible otherwise. In summary, the key benefits
are:
1. Neutron tagging of the inverse beta events would allow the de-convolution of a galactic
supernova’s various signals, which in turn would allow much more detailed interpretation
of the physics of the burst. This will result in significantly improved pointing back to the
exploding star.
2. Early warning (hours before the arrival of the supernova neutrino wave) of large, relatively
nearby supernovas would be possible via the observation of silicon-powered fusion in the
dying stellar core.
3. Gadolinium would allow very late time black hole formation – minutes after the initial
explosion – to be observed. This critically important signal could otherwise be hidden by
background events.
4. The “gadolinium heartbeat” of prompt events rapidly followed by delayed events in about
the same locations would make the arrival of a genuine neutrino burst instantly identifiable,
vital for getting word out to the rest of the world in a timely fashion.
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B. Sterile Neutrino Search
In recent years improved data and models of reactor antineutrino emission led to an increase
in the predicted antineutrino flux from fission reactors, which in turn led to an apparent deficit
in observed flux over many separate experiments, relative to the new prediction [24], [25]. This
deficit has been referred to as the reactor anomaly. Short baseline accelerator experiments such
as LSND [26], [27] and MiniBooNE [28] have also reported anomalous results that are difficult
to reconcile with the standard three-flavor neutrino model. This is sometimes referred to as the
accelerator anomaly. A popular (though by no means unique [25]) interpretation of these results
is that another oscillation channel exists, with at least one sterile (undetectable) neutrino and
relatively large mass eigenstate of at least ∼ 1eV .
The proposed Isotope Decay At Rest (IsoDAR) experiment [29] will search for evidence of short
baseline sterile neutrino oscillation using an intense flux of < E >= 6.4 MeV electron antineutrinos
resulting from beta decay-at-rest of 8Li. The electron antineutrino source will need to be located
next to a kiloton-scale antineutrino detector capable of sufficient energy and position resolution
to reveal oscillations in L/E, where L is the source-detector distance and E is the antineutrino
energy.
One of the first sites considered for the IsoDaR beam experiment was the KamLAND detector.
KamLAND’s position and energy resolution are more than adequate to observe oscillations if the
missing mass eigenstate is ∼ 1eV . Here we examine the sensitivity of the WATCHMAN detector to
sterile neutrinos using the IsoDAR beam. Of course, there are important practical considerations
related to the feasibility of deploying the beam in the experimental hall. Very preliminary studies of
the feasibility of deployment based on the cavern layout have been encouraging, though significant
engineering work would be necessary to accommodate the IsoDAR beam. In this white paper, we
set aside these considerations, focusing on the sensitivity of WATCHMAN detector to the physics
signal, assuming the beam is successfully deployed.
The key difference between the KamLAND and WATCHMAN detectors is the detection
medium, which was liquid scintillator in KamLAND, and will be gadolinium-doped water in
WATCHMAN (in its first phase). In this case, both energy and position resolution will be lower
than for KamLAND, due to the significantly lower photon production from Cherenkov emission
compared to scintillation. However, we anticipate that the resolution in WATCHMAN will be
good enough to exclude the region of oscillation parameter space most favored by the reactor and
accelerator experiments to date (see Figure 7) or indeed discover an oscillation if it is there.
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FIG. 6. The antineutrino flux spectrum of interacting antineutrinos in WATCHMAN. An estimated 6.26×
103 antineutrino interactions can be generated over a five-year period with IsoDAR at the proposed beam
position (16 meters from the center of the detector). The energy and position resolutions for Gd-doped
water, Gd-doped water based liquid scintillator and pure scintillator are also given as a function of energy.
The IsoDAR beam is expected to produce approximately 1.3 × 1023 antineutrinos over a five-
year period at an average energy of 6.4 MeV. The energy spectrum of the resulting antineutrino
interactions is shown in Figure 6. It is slightly higher in energy due to the cross section of the
inverse beta decay reaction on protons, ν¯ + p → e+ + n, which increases with the square of the
antineutrino energy. Just as for reactor antineutrino experiments, the positron energy (Ee+), is
related to the antineutrino energy (Eν¯e), by
Ee+ = Eν¯e − 1.8MeV (2)
The resulting positron energy distribution peaks at approximately 7MeV . As we show here,
despite the absence of scintillator in WATCHMAN Phase I, the ∼ 7MeV positrons are detectable
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with sufficient resolution in the Gd-H2O target to perform a sensitive search for oscillations.
An IsoDAR deployment at a distance of L = 16m from WATCHMAN will have maximal
sensitivity to mass squared difference near ∆m2 ∼ 1eV 2, the region most favored by the reactor
and accelerator anomalies. Figure 7 shows the expected sensitivity of IsoDAR deployment next to
WATCHMAN assuming a 3 year run. The sensitivity for WbLS is also shown, where the medium
is assumed to have a light yield of a few hundred scintillator photons generated per MeV.
FIG. 7. Left: The sensitivity of the WATCHMAN detector to L/E (baseline distance L divided by antineu-
trino energy E), for two different detection media - water (upper plot) and light scintillator (lower plot).
Right: The sterile neutrino oscillation parameter space excluded by WATCHMAN after 3 years of run time,
assuming Gd-doped water (red) and Gd-doped water-based liquid scintillator (black).
The water-based WATCHMAN detector was assumed to have photocathode coverage of 40%,
using 12-inch high quantum efficiency PMTs. Approximately 10 photoelectrons per MeV can be
expected from positrons in water. The sensitivity plots in Figure 7 were based on simulations done
for large water based detector proposals such as LBNE, which in turn grew out of well tested and
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tuned simulations from the Super-K detector.
In generating the sensitivity plots, we used the backgrounds in WATCHMAN that were calcu-
lated for the reactor monitoring task, as summarized in section V. Based on those simulations, we
expect that WATCHMAN will detect approximately 5 IBD events per day from the nearby Perry
reactor. Backgrounds from both cosmogenic radionuclide production and fast neutrons from the
rock are expected at about 6 per day. Backgrounds from the rock or from the PMT structures
inside the detector tend to be subdominant due to the requirement that IBD detection depends
on the coincidence detection of both the positron and delayed neutron. Neutron and gamma-ray
backgrounds from the IsoDAR beam itself will be shielded by rock between the beam and the
detector. We assign a total background rate of ∼ 20 events per day from the reactor and all other
backgrounds.
We conclude that a sensitive sterile neutrino search can be conducted with the WATCHMAN
detector in its first and follow-on phases, using both the Gd-H2O and Gd-WbLS targets.
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C. Non-Standard Neutrino Interactions
As described by [30], a sensitive search for non-standard neutrino interactions can be performed
by collecting a sufficiently large number of antineutrino electron scattering events (ν¯+e− → ν¯+e−).
In both the pure Gd-H2O and scintillator mode, the WATCHMAN detector provides a large
target region that can be used for this purpose, with the antineutrinos coming from the ISODAR
beam. Examples of non-standard interactions include effects on the cross-section arising from
heavy partners of the known light neutrinos, or new gauge bosons that couple only to neutrinos.
In this section we discuss the sensitivity of the WATCHMAN Gd-H2O and scintillator options to
non-standard neutrino interactions. The IsoDAR source characteristics, and the beam and detector
geometry assumed for the calculations here are the same as described in section VIB. However,
in this section, we examine Gd-H2O and oil-based scintillator options, rather than water-based
scintillator.
Following [30], the modified Standard Model cross section incorporating potential non-standard
couplings is written as:
dσ(Eν , T )
dT
=
2G2
F
me
π
(
g˜2R + g˜
2
L(1−
T
Eν
)2 + g˜Rg˜L
)
(3)
Here g˜R = gR + ǫ
eR
ee and g˜L = gL + ǫ
eL
ee are the Standard Model couplings gL(R) , modified by
the NSI parameters ǫ
eR(L)
ee for right-handed and left-handed couplings. Flavor-violating couplings
to muon and tau neutrinos are strongly restricted [31] and are not included in Eqn. (3).
We consider two cases: the WATCHMAN Phase 1 pure Gd-H2O target and the WATCHMAN
Phase 3 scintillator target. We begin with the scintillator case, expected to be similar to Kam-
LAND/IsoDAR. This case has already been studied extensively [30]. We then consider the different
treatment of backgrounds that would be required in a Gd-H2O detector.
1. Sensitivity with a scintillator target
Backgrounds divide into two categories, beam-related IBD events with a missed final-state neu-
tron, and non-beam backgrounds arising from solar neutrino interactions, muon spallation, and
ambient radiation from the detector and nearby rock. In scintillator, the non-beam backgrounds
can be measured in situ accurately by simply turning off the beam. We assume here one year of to-
tal beam off time will be devoted to this measurement. The spectral shape of the IBD backgrounds
can be measured by employing the neutron capture as a tag. The normalization of this background
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will depend on an accurate knowledge of the neutron tag inefficiency - obtained from calibrations.
Gamma ray backgrounds from the detector wall components and from radon in the scintillator are
scaled from the KamLAND/IsoDar prediction by relative fiducial volume. Cosmogenic radionu-
clides are expected to contribute significantly more to the background at WATCHMAN, since they
are depth dependent (see Table VI), and WATCHMAN will be shallower (1430 m.w.e. versus 2700
m.w.e.). We assume that the bulk of radionuclide backgrounds are caused by showering (high en-
ergy) muons passing through the detector. Using a GEANT4 simulation of muon flux as a function
of depth and energy, and using a representative sea level muon energy spectrum, the predicted rate
of showering muons at WATCHMAN, relative to KamLAND is 2.6 times higher. At this rate,
the 5 second KamLAND veto must be reduced to 2 seconds in order to maintain an equivalent
live time. We extrapolated the 11Be, 8Li and 8B rates from KamLAND/IsoDAR using the known
isotope lifetimes (See Table V) to find the rates at WATCHMAN. The WATCHMAN results shown
in Table VI predict approximately 7030 electron scatter events within the WATCHMAN fiducial
volume from an IsoDAR beam situated 16 meters from the center of the detector.
2. Sensitivity with a pure Gd-H2O target
In water, antineutrino-electron scattering events generate a Cherenkov cone that arises from
the recoiling electron. The low light output compared to scintillator changes both the signal and
background detection efficiencies and alters the strategy for isolating the signal. The presence
of oxygen in the target, rather than carbon, increases the variety of radionuclide isotopes that
may be produced via muon spallation. The exact isotopes and their yields, however, have never
been measured in water. We rely on the values in Table V), from [16], generated from a FLUKA
simulation of the Super-Kamiokande detector. The expected event rates for each of the five most
dangerous radionuclides were presented in Table VI.
The signal efficiency depends strongly upon on the visible energy threshold, Evis. This is
necessarily higher in water than in scintillator, since the number of photons produced is small. In
the present analysis, the gamma ray emissions from impurities in the water, the rock walls and
detector walls were estimated by scaling directly from the IsoDAR NSI paper [30], with the same
energy threshold of Evis = 3 MeV applied. The radionuclide, solar neutrino and misidentified
IBD backgrounds (from IsoDAR and from the Perry reactor) have known and well defined energy
spectra. Therefore no low energy threshold was applied for these backgrounds.
Beam-related backgrounds are expected to be higher in water than scintillator, since the effi-
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TABLE V. The most dangerous long lived cosmogenic radionuclide backgrounds for the water-based Super-K
target. The predictions were generated from a FLUKA study by [16]. The radionuclide isotopes of interest
to the organic scintillator experiment include only a subset of these, 11Be, 8Li and 8B [30].
Isotope Half-life (s) Decay Mode Yield (×10−7µ−1g−1cm2) Primary Process
16N 7.13 β−γ(66%), β−(28%) 18 (n,p)
15C 2.449 β−γ(63%), β−(37%) 0.8 (n,2p)
11Be 13.8 β−(55%), β−γ(31%) 0.8 (n,α+ 2p)
8B 0.77 β+ 5.8 (π+, α+ 2p + 2n)
8Li 0.84 β− 13 (π−, α+2 H + p + n)
TABLE VI. The estimated elastic scattering signal and predicted backgrounds after 5 years running time for
IsoDAR at WATCHMAN. Estimates for both the liquid scintillator and Gd −H2O WATCHMAN targets
are given. Also given are background values assuming we use the cosine of the electron scattering angle with
respect to the IsoDAR beam as a discrimination parameter.
Event Type Liquid Scintillator Gd−H2O Gd−H2O, cosine(phi) > 0.5
IsoDAR Elastic Scattering Signal 7030 9010 9010
Misidentified IBD 1920 153500 38380
208T l gamma rays 1154 1154 289
Steel Support Gamma rays 437 437 110
Rock Gamma rays 1025 1025 256
8B Solar Neutrinos 1700 2180 540
Radionuclide 8B 3155 4880 1220
Radionuclide 8Li 5595 12720 3180
Radionuclide 11Be 2840 3690 920
Radionuclide 15C 2320 580
Radionuclide 16N 75750 18940
Total Backgrounds 17830 257660 64415
ciency for detecting the IBD final state neutron is significantly lower (∼ 80%) than in scintillator
(99.75%, [30] with cuts optimized for IBD rejection). Since the cross section per atom and incident
antineutrino is around ten times higher for IBD events compared with ES events, This background
must be further suppressed to achieve a viable result in water. For this purpose, we rely on the
angular correlation between the reconstructed angular direction of the recoiling electron for ES
events and the incoming antineutrino.
Table VI shows the beam and non-beam background predicted for a water Cherenkov WATCH-
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FIG. 8. The predicted water target detector response as a function of detected photoelectrons, according to
the GEANT4 WATCHMAN simulation (left). The cosine of the angle between the reconstructed electron
direction and the antineutrino direction for the electron scattering signal and background at WATCHMAN.
The predicted number of IsoDAR events and backgrounds correspond to 5 years run time. Events at
cosine(angle) = 1 are defined as pointing directly away from the IsoDAR beam source (as expected for a
scattered electron with zero scattering angle). Background events were sampled from a flat cosine(angle)
distribution.
MAN. Note that the misidentified IBD rate is 80 times higher than for scintillator, since the neutron
tagging efficiency drops from 99.75% to 80%. Figure 8 (left) shows the detector background re-
sponse in WATCHMAN. Figure 8 (right) shows the results of a GEANT4 simulation of electron
scattering events in WATCHMAN, assuming a run time of 5 years. The Cherenkov cone reveals the
direction of the scattered electron, the scattered electrons point back to the IsoDAR source. Here
we plot the signal and background events as a function of the cosine of the scattering angle, which
is approximately flat for background, and assumed to be flat here. We anticipate that the water
Cherenkov WATCHMAN experiment will employ a statistical subtraction, based on scattering
angle, to extract the spectral shape and integral number of electron scattering events.
Figure 9 shows the predicted visible spectrum from the electron scattering IsoDAR signal events
together with all the backgrounds considered here. A statistical subtraction of the background was
performed to extract the visible energy (in photoelectrons) of the elastic scattering signal using the
scattering angle distribution.
3. Conclusions
The IsoDAR NSI experiment will be a significant challenge at either KamLAND or WATCH-
MAN. For a liquid scintillator target, the WATCHMAN signal to background will be approximately
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FIG. 9. The WATCHMAN detector response as a function of detected photoelectrons. Shown here are the
total background spectrum, the true scattered electron spectrum from the IsoDAR beam, the sum of the
two (the detected WATCHMAN spectrum), and finally the background subtracted spectrum - the statistical
subtraction of the backgrounds from the detected spectrum, based on the reconstructed electron-antineutrino
scattering angle.
∼ 1 : 2.4. At KamLAND it will be ∼ 1 : 1.4. The difference is primarily due to WATCHMAN’s
shallower depth, but is mitigated by the larger number of detected events. If high quantum effi-
ciency PMTs are used at WATCHMAN the energy resolution will be better, potentially allowing
for some further reduction in background and/or an enhanced energy spectrum. As it stands, we
ignore the potential but uncertain gains from energy resolution and potential problems associated
with not having a non scintillating buffer region between the target and the PMTs. To compare
the statistical uncertainty of both the KamLAND and WATCHMAN scintillator options we must
assume some beam off time is devoted to measuring the background. We assume that one year
of beam off time can be obtained in both experiments. The radionuclide background component
however, can be measured while the beam is on, by analyzing the event rates immediately fol-
lowing muons. We assume that both KamLAND and WATCHMAN will be able to measure the
rate of mis-ID IBD events to a vanishingly small uncertainty using calibration sources. With these
assumptions the statistical significances predicted for KamLAND and WATCHMAN are 19.5σ
and 31.7σ respectively after 5 years beam on and one year beam off. These results correspond to
uncertainties of 5.1% and 3.2% respectively.
For the Gd−H20 target, to determine the statistical significance of the elastic scattering signal
we fit a function consisting of the sum of a constant and exponential to the cosine scattering angle
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distribution.
y = A+Be5.37x (4)
The slope of the exponential component was fixed at the value determined earlier (5.37) from
a simulation of a large number of signal events - we assume that in WATCHMAN a directional
calibration source will be available to help determine the exact shape of the signal component for
the IsoDAR NSI experiment. The uncertainty of the integral number of directional elastic scattered
electrons from IsoDAR therefore is given by the fractional uncertainty of the normalizing intercept
of the exponential at cosine(θ) = +1, which is ±3%. The final predicted number of NSI elastic
scattering events from IsoDAR over five years for the Gd − H2O target is therefore 9010 ± 270,
an uncertainty of ±3.0%. The reason the statistical uncertainty of the Gd − H2O result is so
small, even though the signal to background is small (relative to the scintillator option), is because
scattering angle sensitivity allows for a more precise measurement of the background even while
the beam is on.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
WATCHMAN offers a compelling, cost-effective approach to exploiting the unique synergy be-
tween strategic research goals of the U.S. nonproliferation and physics communities. The detector
will provide immediate physics benefit through its tagging ability for supernova antineutrinos, and
consequent sensitivity to the highly directional supernova neutrino signal. In a follow-on phase,
it will provide a target for the ISODAR neutrino beam, enabling both a stringent sterile neutrino
search and a search for non-standard neutrino interactions. Perhaps most importantly for the
long-term future of U.S. neutrino physics, WATCHMAN provides a suitably large platform that is
uniquely suited to testing of essential elements of very large neutrino detectors. The combination of
Water Based Liquid Scintillator with Large Area Picosecond Photodetectors in WATCHMAN will
ensure the viability of these technologies for all follow-on detectors. In recognition of this overlap
with the future U.S. physics program, the WATCHMAN collaboration has grown to include many
of the country’s most knowledgeable experts in water-based neutrino detection, as well as members
of the Advanced Scintillator Detector Concept, an initiative that is planning for the construction
of a multi-hundred-ton WBLS detector in the United States. The benefit of WATCHMAN to
the nonproliferation community is similarly important. WATCHMAN is a stepping-stone to true
long range discovery or exclusion of small reactors. It provides a path to international, collabo-
rative efforts at guaranteeing the absence of operating reactors in wide geographical regions, with
important, positive implications for the nonproliferation regime.
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